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NATO'S INTERACTING MODELS OF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION

NATO's first objective in a period of East-West tension is to convince Soviet leaders that it can mount a defensive effort capable of rendering any attack by the Warsaw Pact both costly and uncertain of success. As a former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee writes, "The whole NATO enterprise is about deterrence and everything within the Alliance . . . [is] there simply and solely to create and sustain this one overriding element."* Thus, the Alliance must be able in timely fashion to man its defenses with sufficient combat-ready forces to dissuade a hostile Politburo away from any expectation of a quick and cheap advance across Western Europe.

Alliance nations have found prohibitive the costs of manning their NATO forward defense positions fully and continually with active duty personnel. Accordingly, they have adopted various modes of mobilizing their national resources in time of crisis to bring their deployed forces in Europe up to effective wartime strength. Meeting the challenge of deterrence, however, means getting a proper combination of forces together and moving them to their forward positions in time to make a difference.

This problem is particularly demanding with respect to NATO's central region. Here, unlike the flanks, a credible deterrent posture is the mutual responsibility of seven different nations within NATO's current military command structure.** This paper examines the different processes by which these nations plan to mobilize their resources and move their reinforcements into position. It also identifies problems likely to be encountered in coordinating the simultaneous flow of these resources in the central region and suggests some areas where improvement can be made.

*Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Peter Hill-Norton, No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO (Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1978), p. 21.

**Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France, still a member of NATO but not currently placing its forces under NATO's military command structure, also has a military role in defense of the central region under a bilateral agreement with the FRG.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO MOBILIZATION

As used in this paper, mobilization to reinforce NATO encompasses the assembly of available manpower--both active and reserve--materiel and transportation resources and their deployment so that they can be integrated directly into Allied Command Europe's deterrent or defensive posture. Some of these resources would be diverted from lower priority activities within the nations' active duty military establishments. Other resources would be activated from reserve status and called into government service from the civilian economic sector. Once formal mobilization begins, not only would additional manpower be made available for all the military services, but some private commercial enterprises would come under public control, some transportation resources would be requisitioned by the state, and civilian emergency administrative agencies would be activated. In short, the way of conducting daily business in the nations of the Alliance would be altered substantially.

To be sure, these are not steps which NATO members would take lightly. Indeed, each of them no doubt would prefer avoiding such measures until their need had been made absolutely clear. The motivation and circumstances which would be required to obtain the national decisions to mobilize and reinforce NATO are outside the scope of this paper. So are the considerations of national sovereignty that might serve to delay such decisions. The paper deals, rather, with problems of managing the reinforcement resources which the different national mobilization processes can make available.

Among the nations participating in the reinforcement of NATO's central region, two models of national mobilization have emerged. One may be labeled a Continental model in that its central features are incorporated in the mobilization procedures of all continental nations with central region responsibilities, including France. The other will be called an Anglo-American model, described principally by the common practices of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Continental Model

The central features of the Continental mobilization model are listed briefly in Fig. 1.

- o Conscription of active military manpower
- o Reserve obligation for both conscripts and volunteers
- o Reservist augmentation of active combat units
- o Pre-mobilization recall of selected ground force reservists
- o Active cadre in large reserve ground combat units intended for NATO service
- o Formal mobilization for bulk of recalls and for civil activations.

Fig. 1--Continental model of national mobilization.

All the continental nations in NATO provide for the bulk of their military manpower in peacetime by maintaining programs of military conscription. Eligibility ages vary slightly from nation to nation and the terms of required active military service range from 6 to 15 months. For most conscripts, this means service in the ground forces, but volunteerism for that service and, for the navies and air forces as well, is stimulated by the national conscription. Conscripts receive their training and perform their service obligation in regular TO&E units. At the completion of this service, however, they and the volunteers must also undertake a reserve obligation, usually until age 45 or 50. In the Federal Republic and in the Netherlands, this period of reserve duty is shorter if the reservist is neither an NCO or officer.

All continental NATO nations rely on reservists to augment active combat units that are maintained below authorized strength during peacetime. Although filling out some combat support and combat service support units by this process as well, much of this augmentation occurs directly to combat maneuver units. In most cases, this would be accomplished by individual reservists who would be assigned to units as fillers soon after activation. One notable exception is the Netherlands, whose RIM system enables augmentation to occur by small units.* Companies of conscripts, organized at the time of their initial active duty training, remain intact during a specific period of reserve status and are activated as units to augment predesignated Army battalions. Understrength battalions, to

*Rechstreeks Instroomend Mobilizabel, which may be translated as "direct intake mobilizeable."



be so augmented upon mobilization, populate most of the Netherlands' active brigades during peacetime.

As part of the procedures which sovereign governments normally develop for advancing the readiness of their military forces in time of crisis, some continental reservists are selected for recall prior to formal mobilization. The ministers of defense for all NATO's continental members have been granted authority by their respective parliaments for early recall of specified numbers of ground force reservists. This authority enables key positions and units to be filled early in a crisis without fanfare and without the economic and psychological disruption which full-scale mobilization inevitably levies on the civilian population. In several cases, the reservists subject to these early recall measures are recently discharged and during a specified period thereafter are under obligation to return to their former units to replace conscripts who have not yet completed the initial training. In the Federal Republic and the Netherlands, the personnel who return to serve this function are actually still on active duty but on leave status. Many of them enter yet another rapid recall category upon their official discharge into the reserves.

Continental nations having defense responsibilities in NATO's central region organize some of their reservists into large ground combat units that are intended for NATO service upon activation. After forming, they would have to assemble their equipment and move into their assigned defensive positions in the Federal Republic. These units include active duty cadre in peacetime. The technical capabilities and experience of these active soldiers provide a stiffening around which the reservists in the unit can more readily assume their combat roles when called into active service.

Within each of the continental NATO nations, formal mobilization must be declared before the vast majority of reservists can be recalled to active duty. Formal mobilization is necessary also for invoking the emergency powers needed to augment central administrative agencies and reorganize the essential civil services in support of national defense. In most of these countries with central region responsibilities, full cabinet action is all that is required to

obtain mobilization order; only in the Federal Republic is it necessary to obtain a prior declaration of national emergency by the parliament (Bundestag). The parliaments of all continental nations, however, may be expected to affect the extent of mobilization in subsequent debate and to exert strong influence on the specific measures which their respective governments' actions entail.

Anglo-American Model

The Anglo-American model of national mobilization contains the features shown in Fig. 2.

- o Reliance on volunteers for both active and reserve manpower
- o Reserve obligation for regular enlistees
- o Variation in reservist augmentation of active combat units
- o No formal provision for pre-mobilization recall of ground force reservists
- o Early reinforcement of NATO with active forces
- o Wide variation in size of reserve ground combat units and role of active cadre
- o Formal mobilization required for significant recalls and readiness advancement

Fig. 2--Anglo-American model of national mobilization.

Unlike the continental nations, the Anglo-American members of NATO* man both their active and reserve military forces entirely with volunteers. Those enlisting in the regular forces, moreover, usually incur some reserve obligation at the completion of their agreed term of active service. In this matter, the Canadians and British mirror the practice of their continental allies by obligating discharged regulars for reserve duty until they reach a certain age. U.S. ground force regulars currently enlist for a total period of six years, with a tour in the reserves completing the period, depending on the length of initial active service. U.S. careerists with more than one term of active duty may volunteer for a stipulated period of reserve status after being discharged. Both American and British citizens, moreover, may volunteer initially for a term in a special category of reserves, the National Guard and the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR), respectively.

*Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Anglo-American practice in the augmentation of active combat units during a crisis varies considerably. Canada would augment her brigade group deployed to Europe in peacetime with other active forces normally stationed at home. The U.K. plans to augment some of its active formations with reservists, both individuals and units. Individuals from the U.K.'s Regular Reserve would be mobilized to fill selected wartime positions, and some TAVR units would be activated to deploy and integrate with larger formations of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). U.S. augmentations with reservists would occur by unit, with some combat service support units of the Selected Army Reserve being activated to enable larger active combat formations to operate overseas under wartime conditions.

Not yet adopting the practice of their continental partners, the Anglo-American participants in NATO's reinforcement have made no formal provisions for recalling a specified body of ground force reservists in advance of formal mobilization. The arrangement closest to the pre-mobilization recalls in Europe is the U.S. President's authority to call into active duty up to 50,000 selected reservists, by unit, without a declaration of national emergency. But this authorized number includes the recalls of all three military services. In a crisis, it could be necessary to recall a substantial number of Air Force and Navy reservists to carry out specific crisis related functions, thereby reducing to a much lower limit the number of Army reservists who could be activated. In theory, at least, the U.K. government is even less encumbered: Its Secretary of State for Defence has the authority, unique among NATO member ministers of defense, to call up in the name of the sovereign any size or composition of reserve force "if it appears . . . that national danger is imminent or that a great emergency has arisen."^{*} Such an order must be communicated to the Parliament "forthwith," and if not in session, Parliament would be called back into session "to continue to sit and act," presumably for the duration of an emergency.

^{*}"The Reserve Force Act 1966," Halsbury's Statutes of England, Vol. 29, London, Butterworths, 1971, Sec. 5, p. 841.

For the most part, Anglo-American reinforcement of NATO ground force formations in the early part of a crisis would be accomplished with active forces, both individuals and units. To enable their movement as rapidly as possible, these early reinforcements would deploy only with personal and light unit equipment; heavy weapons and equipment such as tanks and armored personnel carriers would be awaiting them near their European destinations. Individual fillers and selected ground force units from Canada's active military establishment would augment the already forward deployed battle group near its NATO defense position. Units of the BAOR serving on rotation in Ulster would rejoin their parent organization in Germany. Most of three active U.S. Army divisions, augmented only by some reserve service support units, would fly directly to Germany to link up with their prepositioned equipment.* Of the Anglo-American partners, only the U.K. plans to reinforce promptly its NATO committed ground forces with combat units from the reserve. Some TAVR battalions would be deployed to the continent along with smaller logistics units and individual reservist augmentees.

Within their respective reserve components, the different Anglo-American members of NATO maintain ground combat units that vary widely in size and in their active duty cadre composition. Hence, the reinforcement roles which these units can play upon mobilization also vary. Canadian reservists augment its active force strictly as individuals. Britain's TAVR units are battalion sized or smaller. As such, the state of training within each unit can be kept relatively uniform, and some of these units, thus, can be made available for early reinforcement purposes. U.S. reserve combat units, mostly in the National Guard, are division or brigade-sized. Composed of many smaller specialized units, they are, thus, subject to a wide range of training readiness. Moreover, while the UK historically has employed active duty cadre to stiffen and train its reserve units, the United States is currently only beginning to experiment with this concept. U.S. reserve combat units are not counted on as reinforcements until later in a crisis period.*

*Each of these divisions, including the REFORGER unit, would be joining with one of its brigades already maintained in Europe during the non-crisis period.

Like the continental nations, the Anglo-American members of NATO must begin formal mobilization before large numbers of reservists may be called up and before the emergency powers essential to enlarging key civil support services may be invoked. Except under mobilization conditions the transportation resources needed to move large numbers of men and large quantities of equipment cannot be pressed into government service. For budgetary reasons, neither can the workloads and staffs of central agencies be increased substantially. In the United States, these conditions require a Congressional declaration (or affirmation) of a state of national emergency. In Canada and the UK, mobilization involves formal action by the government that, in turn, brings their respective parliaments promptly into advisory and overseeing roles. Unlike their continental partners, however, formal mobilization must be instituted by the Anglo-American governments before even readiness advancement can take place in significant ways. Without a declared emergency, substantial numbers of ground force reservists cannot be activated and, in the United States at least, the airlift required to move most of the active duty reinforcements quickly to Europe cannot be assembled.

INTERFACING THE MOBILIZATION MODELS

Sir Peter Hill-Norton has emphasized that if NATO's objective of deterring a conventional attack is to remain valid, NATO's different schemes for reinforcing the central region "must be perceived by both sides" as giving good promise of actually working when a crisis occurs.⁺ Thus the different mobilization processes by which the NATO partners plan to reinforce must be well coordinated to enable the various national resources to move quickly and simultaneously to their forward defense areas on the continent. The two models of national mobilization must be able to interface smoothly if deterrence is to work.

*John Fialka, "Ill-Equipped, Undermanned U.S. Army is Destroyed in 'Nifty Nugget' Exercise," The Washington Star, November 2, 1979, p. A-2.

†Hill-Norton, op. cit., p. 35.

Of course, one cannot predict with any confidence what a scenario of NATO reinforcement would be. The independent responsibility for decisions and the freedom of action of each member to advance its own readiness when facing a crisis make it impossible to be certain in what order and to what degrees the various nations would initiate mobilization procedures. However, if mobilization (M-Day) were declared simultaneously among all participants in the reinforcement of NATO's central region and the models were implemented substantially as described above, some interesting observations may be made, as follows:

Prior to M-Day

In the period preceding an assumed common M-Day, each of the continental members of NATO could respond to signals of developing crisis by taking individual measures to advance the readiness state of its forces. The respective MoDs could invoke their pre-mobilization authority to recall selected reservists and thereby augment the active ground combat units of Belgium, the FRG, and the Netherlands. Some forward movement of these reinforcements and of active units whose peacetime basing is at some distance from their forward defense positions could also take place, within the limited capacity of unmobilized national transport systems. For example, five active brigades of the Netherlands 1st Corps are based on Dutch territory in peacetime even though assigned to NATO and committed to defend positions along the FRG's eastern border.* Some of this force may be able to deploy into Germany prior to mobilization.

The pre-mobilization period could also see some redeploy of UK and U.S. dual-based forces. Provided suitable replacements could be assembled to take over their anti-terrorist mission, the BAOR units on rotation in Ulster could be returned to their organizations in Germany. So could BAOR personnel on leave or attending schools in the UK. U.S. REFORGER units and some other dual-based active forces could be flown to Germany in Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft by active and some reserve Air Force crews.

*R. D. M. Furlong, "Dutch Defense Policy for the '80s: Less Nuclear, More Conventional," International Defense Review, Vol. 12, No. 3/1979, p. 320.

Attempting a large-scale deployment of active Anglo-American forces prior to general mobilization, however, could create difficult problems. According to a series of articles in The Washington Star, the Nifty Nugget mobilization exercise, conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October-November 1978, indicated that intensive use of the active U.S. strategic airlift fleet would be likely to result in slowdowns and breakdowns from lack of spare parts, shortages of cargo-handling equipment and the like. As the Air Force reported, "at least 30 percent of the air cargoes needed in Europe in Nifty Nugget never got off the ground because the many delays compounded what has been a known shortage of strategic airlift."* Part of the shortage could be relieved through full activation of the largely passenger carrying Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CHAF)--but only after a declared national emergency, as part of the many available national mobilization measures. Airlift capability could be augmented prior to mobilization to some extent also by the recall of Air Force reservists using the President's authority to call up 50,000 of the Selected Reserve. But to the extent that this rubric were used for airlift enhancement a corresponding limitation would be incurred in the ability to recall ground force reserve units, some of which might be needed to fulfill specific functions in support of the deploying active combat formations.

Another kind of problem would be faced at the receiving end of any large-scale, premobilization deployment of active forces to Europe. Under the assumed circumstance of a common M-Day within the Alliance, such a deployment would take place prior to the mobilization of essential transportation resources and civilian manpower pools in Europe. Thus, civilian transportation and distribution industries would be conducting business as usual. Docking and air terminal facilities would be occupied by commercial traffic. Reserve forces like units of the F56's Territorial Army, dedicated to military materiel handling and logistical traffic flow under mobilization

*John Fialko, "Pentagon Logistics Bridge Fails," The Washington Star, November 3, 1979, p. A-6.

conditions, would still be engaged in regular civilian pursuits. In short, much of the European capability to receive and distribute the reinforcing Anglo-American manpower and materiel, dependent on national mobilizations, would not yet be formed.

After M-Day

Theoretically, once mobilization has been declared, interactions between the two models should proceed smoothly to enable NATO's reinforcement. After that point, the essential civilian services and reserve forces needed to make reinforcement work would be activated in each participating nation, and there would be no impediments to a smooth flow of men and materiel into NATO's central region--theoretically. Once the NATO reinforcement process begins in earnest, however, the participating nations must anticipate management problems resulting from the sheer magnitude of the operation. If prior planning and organization are not thorough enough to accommodate the complex flows of different national resources--both to and from the Continent--NATO's system for reinforcement might quickly become overwhelmed.

Some of these reinforcement management problems were experienced by officials of the U.S. Department of Defense during the aforementioned Nifty Nugget deployment exercise. But problems of the sort detailed below could well affect many of the NATO partners and the Alliance headquarters as well.*

Simultaneous demands on the transport system. Many movements of men and materiel that are necessary to NATO's deterrent posture cannot be made now until mobilization has formally been called into being. At that point, therefore, a large number of simultaneous demands would be levied on the transport system. In Nifty Nugget, for example, major shipments of military materiel could not be arranged until a national emergency had been declared, even though it was clear at that moment that war reserve stocks and prepositioned ammunition

*Unless specifically footnoted, all the examples cited have been taken from the series of articles by John Fialka on exercise Nifty Nugget appearing in The Washington Star, 2-4 November 1979.

levels in Europe were well below what was needed for the early deploying active divisions. Exercise players found that, apart from a national emergency, such items could not be withdrawn and shipped overseas from the Army materiel command storage sites. Then, once the authority was obtained, such emergency shipments competed for airlift scheduling with the movement of needed augmentation forces.

Critical transportation resource limitations. The simultaneous demands of large-scale reinforcement operations make the aforementioned limitations on the availability of airlift aircraft even more acute. Although emergency activation of the CRAF would provide adequate passenger carrying capacity, the limitations on large-size cargo capacity would continue to be severe. In addition, Nifty Nugget traffic managers also found that the carrying capacity of U.S. railroads delayed the shipment of tanks and other heavy military cargo from their storage depots to ports of embarkation. This kind of limitation might affect the performance of European surface transport as well. In a situation involving competing demands on a large scale, rolling stock of a particular capacity might have to be relocated to portions of the rail system where the need for that equipment was greatest.

Changes in priorities and dispositions. In actual crises, military commanders and traffic managers are quite likely to want to alter predetermined movement priorities and change the planned disposition of specific units or equipment so as to deal with the specific crisis situation. Even in the JCS exercise, attempts to replace inoperative surface-to-air missiles from CONUS units and to fill depleted prepositioned equipment stocks early in the reinforcement ran afoul of pre-planned airlift scheduling for the delivery of logistical support for forward deploying units. Computer-supported load planning had to be put aside, and the manual methods adopted in its place caused considerable delays and deviations from the anticipated airlift sortie rate.

Back-flow of civilians and military casualties. The idea of reinforcing NATO tends to produce images of a steady West-East flow of manpower and materiel and of a management effort dedicated to that end, but the movement management problem is much more complex. In Nifty Nugget, airlift assets used to move troops to Europe were also used on the return leg to backhaul military casualties and civilian dependents who were being evacuated from the likely combat and logistical buildup areas. The resulting transfer of large numbers of civilians onto military ports of embarkation in the CONUS tended to overwhelm reception facilities and administrative services. It interfered with the primary task of processing military personnel for reinforcement assignments and assembling them for movement overseas. The arrival of casualties also created an unanticipated demand for traffic management to assure that they were moved expeditiously to hospitals in other parts of the United States. One's imagination need not roam too wildly to visualize similar problems occurring at European terminals and processing centers during a crisis. Sir John Hackett includes in his provocative narrative, The Third World War, the spectre of thousands of German civilians pouring into the transportation nodes and jamming the surface routes of communication at the very time when NATO reinforcements and garrisoned troops were attempting to move up to forward defense positions.*

Operational delays and breakdowns. In addition to the delays resulting from the specific problems noted above, other delays are bound to occur for random operational reasons. Only a few will be mentioned here. One of the most commonly encountered sources of delay is equipment failure, frequently a function of high-volume use and continued exposure to potential mishandling. Under the conditions of large-scale mobilization and reinforcement and the stresses of an international crisis, these variables will obtain. Another possible source of delays and altered programs in a real crisis is weather. Particularly in Western Europe, there will be days when low visibility

*General Sir John Hackett, et al., The Third World War, August 1985, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), pp. 157, 166.

precludes continuous air traffic and when hazardous road conditions contribute to surface transport snarls. Still another source of delays is the occasional, localized unavailability of sufficient spare parts of a particular kind. No amount of preplanning can avoid completely the occasional occurrence of this kind of problem. And when it occurs, as it will during intensive deployment operations, movements of particular cargoes and adherence to preferred schedules simply may not be possible until the missing item can be obtained or fashioned.

The reader will recall that these problems have been suggested as likely to follow the initiation of large-scale reinforcement enabled by national mobilization. Further, that mobilization was assumed in this discussion to occur on an M-Day common to all participants in defense of NATO's central region. If, however, national mobilizations may not occur simultaneously, or nearly so, the potential for uncoordinated deployments and conflicting demands on available facilities can increase exponentially.

AREAS OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT

If NATO's reinforcement is to take place with a minimum of snarls and confusion, so as to enhance rather than detract from deterrence, it should be evident that national mobilization and deployment actions must be well coordinated. It is equally evident that this is unlikely to occur unless the participating nations engage jointly in the anticipation of problems and the preplanning of options well in advance of a crisis. Whether arranged through NATO offices or engaged in bilaterally, joint planning of the interactions that must occur among the reinforcement steps of the different NATO partners is essential.

Joint planning could be pursued profitably in the following areas:

- o Increased availability of pre-mobilization resources. Joint planning should encourage nations to increase the variety and magnitude of resource-supply actions they can take prior to formal

mobilization. In some cases, this would require special legislation to be drafted by national governments and submitted to their parliaments for study and possible enactment. Examples might include: (1) larger partial activation packages for an emergency civil air fleet, perhaps to include European as well as U.S. CRAF airframes and crews; (2) executive authority to shift large quantities of U.S. military equipment and munitions to storage sites in Europe to meet pre-mobilization emergency demands; (3) executive authority to activate selectively and deploy European reserve combat units earmarked for NATO service; (4) doubling the number of Selected Reserve personnel that the U.S. President can recall without the formal declaration of a national emergency.

o Increased numbers of European reserve combat units. Joint planning should explore the capability of European nations to organize and equip additional major combat units to be earmarked for NATO services from their reserve components.* While this provision would not be likely to contribute directly to reinforcement early in the crisis, it could encourage earlier activation and commitment of some presently earmarked units. Units now being deliberately reserved for later commitment to NATO corps commanders could be replaced in that role by the newer units and thus freed for earlier deployment to the forward defense areas.

o Alternative ways to obtain reception services. Joint planning should pursue alternatives to national mobilization for obtaining in Europe the supporting services essential to the reception of reinforcements from other nations. For example, commercial contracts might be arranged to obligate European firms to make available the

*The available option of increasing the numbers of European reserve combat units has been articulated impressively by Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, in a seminar paper "European Military Postures," that he presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 28 February 1980. Advantages that would be provided, by additional European reserve units have been advocated also by Steven Canby in "European Mobilization, U.S. and NATO Reserves," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1978; and in "NATO Defense: the Problem is Not More Money," Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 1979.

machines, vehicles, and operators needed when manpower and accompanying equipment begin arriving at aerial ports on the continent. Regular civil agencies of the host governments might furnish selected employees who could be trained in advance to perform the administrative functions associated with processing the arriving reinforcements and cargoes and with allocating them to appropriate provisions for distribution and assembly.

o Central authority to coordinate and manage deployments.

Joint planning should devise a central authority within NATO Headquarters to oversee and coordinate the national planning for NATO reinforcement and dependent evacuation. This same office, when a decision to reinforce is made, would then manage the interaction of the different reception activities and transport systems to facilitate a smooth reinforcement operation. Such an authority would provide an administrative arrangement similar to that now afforded by the U.S. Joint Deployment Agency* at the level of the Alliance. It would insure an internationally integrated movement of various resources still under national control until they were formally turned over to SACEUR's control in the military theater.

Joint planning is a vital feature of NATO peacetime activity, and it proceeds already in many areas. Vigorous effort in the planning areas suggested above, however, would lead NATO members to the heart of effective reinforcement. And unless NATO exerts such effort in advance to ensure the coordinated flow of men and equipment in a crisis, the different national processes of mobilization could produce an effect opposite to the enhancement of deterrence. Uncoordinated mobilization and deployments might even encourage the Warsaw Pact to attack while NATO's confusion was most evident.

*Allan R. Scholin, "Joint Deployment Agency Goes to Work," Air Force Magazine, January 1980, pp. 50-54.